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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
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MATEY, Circuit Judge.
Ericka Richardson and Luis Silva each wanted to open a commercial cleaning
business. So each bought a franchise from Coverall North America, Inc. (CNA) through
Sujol, LLC d/b/a Coverall of Southern New Jersey (Sujol). But disagreements followed the
signed agreements, and Richardson and Silva filed a putative class action alleging they are
the Defendants’ employees, not independent contractors, under New Jersey law. We do not
address who has the better argument, because the contracts both delegate that authority to
an arbitrator. So we will reverse the District Court’s Order in part and vacate in part and
remand for further consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Agreements
CNA sells commercial cleaning services. It operates a franchise business system

through geographically designated territories. Sujol, known as a “master franchisee,” owns
one of these territories and entered into agreements with Richardson (in 2016) and Silva
(in 2005) to operate cleaning businesses. CNA is not a named party to either the Richardson
or Silva agreement (collectively “the Agreements”). Rather, CNA has an agreement with
Sujol allowing Sujol to sell franchises using CNA’s trademarks and operating system.
Problems arose in 2017, as Richardson and Silva began to question their relationship
with Sujol and, as a result, the fees due under the Agreements. So they filed a putative class
action in the Superior Court of Middlesex County, New Jersey, claiming that while the
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Agreements label them as “independent contractors,” they are really employees under New
Jersey law. (App. at 38–48 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-19(i)(6)).) Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants had violated the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (NJWPL), N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:11-4.1 et seq., by allegedly misclassifying them as independent contractors, charging
them for a job, and taking unlawful deductions from their wages. (App. at 38–48.) CNA
and Sujol removed the matter to federal court, and then moved under Section 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration. (App. at 7.)
B.

The District Court’s Interpretation of the Agreements
The District Court considered both the who and the what: whether the parties agreed

to delegate questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator and, in Richardson’s case, whether
CNA could enforce the arbitration clause. First, the District Court found the incorporation
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules in Silva’s
agreement did not satisfy the clarity needed for delegation, at least with an “unsophisticated
party.” Applying New Jersey law, the District Court also held that the arbitration agreement
did not cover Silva’s NJWPL claims. Second, the District Court found Richardson’s
agreement with Sujol delegated arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. But the court
determined that CNA could not invoke the arbitration clause. Timely appeals by Sujol and
CNA followed.1
II. JURISDICTION AND THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

After the District Court’s Order, Richardson dismissed her claim against Sujol,
leaving only the three claims for which the Motion had been denied. As such, the part of
the Order granting the Motion as to Richardson’s claim against Sujol is now moot.
1
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), and we have
jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) to consider an order refusing a stay pending
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. We largely review that decision de novo, except for
underlying findings of fact, which we review for clear error. See Morales v. Sun
Contractors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008).
III. ANALYSIS
We use a two-step process to evaluate an arbitration clause in a contract: 1) whether
there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; and 2) whether that agreement encompasses the
dispute at issue. Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 254 (3d Cir. 2019). State law governs
both steps. See id. at 254–55; In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d
515, 522 (3d Cir. 2019). And parties are free to assign the resolution of these issues to an
arbitrator. See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335 (3d Cir. 2014). But
that delegation requires “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence of the parties’ intent. First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (alterations in original).
A.

Arbitrability of Silva’s Claim Against Sujol
We start with who decides, as the Defendants argue that the incorporation of the

AAA Rules in Silva’s arbitration clause constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that
the parties agreed to delegate arbitrability. We agree. Silva’s agreement provides that “all
controversies, disputes or claims between Coverall . . . and Franchisee . . . shall be
submitted promptly for arbitration” and that “[a]rbitration shall be subject to . . . the then
current Rules of the American Arbitration Association for Commercial Arbitration.” (App.
at 94.) Clearly and unmistakably then, the AAA Rules govern the arbitration of any dispute
5

between Silva and Sujol. And Rule 7(a) of the AAA Rules states that “[t]he arbitrator shall
have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect
to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any
claim or counterclaim.” American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules
and Mediation Procedures, Rule 7(a). That provision “is about as ‘clear and unmistakable’
as language can get.” Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2009). Nor
is the rest of Silva’s contract so ambiguous or unclear that the meaning of the AAA Rules
becomes murky.2
Silva responds that relying on incorporated rules is unreasonable in agreements
involving “unsophisticated parties.”3 But that likely stretches too far and would disregard
the “clear and unmistakable” standard and ignore even the plainest of delegations. See
Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Our holding today should

While “[v]irtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that
incorporation of the [AAA] arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence
that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,” we need not determine whether such a rule
always applies. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petrol., LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 763–64
(3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724
F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)). Even where an agreement incorporates the AAA Rules,
a contract might still otherwise muddy the clarity of the parties’ intent to delegate. For
example, in Chesapeake Appalachia, we held that the mere incorporation of unspecified
AAA rules did not demonstrate an intent to delegate arbitrability in a class action. We
explained that finding clear and unmistakable evidence in that case required jumping from
1) the contract, to 2) the reference to unspecified AAA rules, to 3) the AAA Commercial
Rules and, lastly, to 4) the AAA Supplementary rules, which ultimately vested an arbitrator
with the authority to decide class arbitrability. 809 F.3d at 761. But Silva’s contract requires
no such “daisy-chain” of inferences. Id.
3
Although it is not clear from the record that Silva lacks sophistication, we will
assume as much.
2
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not be interpreted to require that the contracting parties be sophisticated . . . before a court
may conclude that incorporation of the AAA rules constitutes ‘clear and unmistakable’
evidence of the parties’ intent [to delegate arbitrability].”); see also McGee v. Armstrong,
941 F.3d 859, 863, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2019); Arnold v. Homeaway, Inc., 890 F.3d 546, 548–
49, 551–52 (5th Cir. 2018); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 767–69 (8th
Cir. 2011). Here, the clarity of Silva’s agreement shows the intent to delegate the
arbitrability. So we will reverse the District Court’s contrary conclusion and remand.
B.

CNA’s Ability to Enforce the Arbitration Clauses
The District Court held that CNA could not enforce Richardson’s arbitration clause,

because it was not a third-party beneficiary of Richardson’s agreement with Sujol. CNA
advances several interpretive arguments, paired with pleas for equitable estoppel, all aimed
at allowing CNA to compel arbitration. Some of these issues arise for the first time on
appeal; others arose before the District Court only in a cursory manner. All are best fully
considered by the District Court in the first instance, a path that follows from our
conclusions on the Silva agreement. Because we hold that Silva and Sujol agreed to
delegate arbitrability, we likewise will vacate the District Court’s determination that
Silva’s arbitration clause does not encompass his claim against Sujol. That leaves
undecided whether CNA can also enforce Silva’s arbitration clause, an issue not raised in
this appeal. And since CNA’s rights in both the Silva and Richardson agreements may
benefit from discovery, see Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764,
774–76 (3d Cir. 2013), we will vacate the District Court’s Order regarding whether CNA
is a third-party beneficiary of the Richardson contract.
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